Irak no será otro Vietnam

Publicado: noviembre 4, 2007 en ojo con el sordo
Etiquetas:,

En mi antiguo blog di algunas recetas tipo nazi para acabar con la insurgencia terrorista iraquí, porque al igual que todo el mundo pensé que esa guerra estaba irremediablemente perdida…. No había sido así pues me alegro por ello. Bartle Bull (tenía que ser inglés) opina lo contrario. Hago una acotación por mi parte sobre los soldados norteamericanos muertos en Iraq que llegan en 3 años a 3.500 muertos En la invasión a Normandía en la Segunda Guerra Mundial murió una cifra similar en tan solo 8 horas bajo el fuego de ametralladora y artillería pesada nazi.
¿Victoria en Irak? Mario Vargas Llosa*
¿Alguien se atrevería a afirmar, hoy, contra la impresión generalizada, que la intervención militar en Irak en vez de un fracaso catastrófico va cumpliendo con sus objetivos y ha alcanzado ya un punto de no retorno? Bartle Bull, experto inglés en el Medio Oriente, en el último número de Prospect, la prestigiosa revista londinense que dirige David Goodhart, publica un ensayo defendiendo esta tesis, titulado: “Misión cumplida”. Sus argumentos son polémicos, pero nada propagandísticos ni demagógicos.
Bull pone de lado la cuestión de si fue errónea o acertada la decisión de intervenir en Irak —algo que decidirán en el futuro los historiadores— y se limita a hacer un cotejo entre la situación actual del país y la que reinaba allá hace cuatro años y medio, cuando Estados Unidos, Inglaterra y un grupo de países aliados decidieron acabar con la dictadura de Saddam Hussein. Sostiene que en la actualidad las fuerzas de la coalición se hallan en Irak con la anuencia de un gobierno democráticamente elegido y con un mandato que la ONU ha venido renovando cada año desde mayo del 2003, la última vez en agosto pasado.
A su juicio, las metas estratégicas de la intervención se han alcanzado. Irak no se ha desintegrado y su unidad territorial y política parece ahora más firme que antaño pues el descentralizado sistema en marcha cuenta incluso con el apoyo de los kurdos, cuya vocación independentista ha mermado de manera radical. En vez de una dictadura el país es una democracia en la que, en todas las elecciones celebradas, la participación popular ha sido enorme, por encima de la que caracteriza a las sociedades abiertas de Occidente, de modo que su gobierno tiene una indiscutible legitimidad jurídica y política. Y se ha dado una Constitución que garantiza una independencia institucional y libertades públicas que ni Irak, ni ninguno de sus vecinos, ha conocido en su historia. No ha estallado la guerra civil e Irán no ha ocupado Irak ni tutela su vida política. El país ha dejado de ser un peligro para la paz mundial y, aunque muy lentamente, va convirtiéndose en la primera sociedad árabe con elecciones libres, libertad de prensa, partidos políticos diversos y derechos civiles reconocidos.
La violencia, claro está, sigue causando terribles sufrimientos. Pero, aunque sea obscena la comparación, el número de víctimas de esta guerra y del terrorismo resultante —entre ochenta y doscientas mil se cifran los cálculos— está lejos de alcanzar el millón y medio de muertos que resultaron de las guerras, genocidios y represiones del régimen baazista de Saddam Hussein. La inmensa mayoría de estas muertes ha sido obra de las matanzas ciegas e indiscriminadas contra la población civil cometidas por los terroristas extranjeros de Al Qaeda o los de organizaciones suníes y chiíes que guerreaban entre sí y trataban de neutralizar a la población civil mediante el pánico. Aunque este género de violencia probablemente se prolongue todavía durante buen tiempo —el número de fanáticos capaces de hacerse volar en pedazos con un camión o coche cargado de explosivos parece inacabable— ella ha perdido toda significación política y en la actualidad se ha convertido en un problema puramente local y policial. Ha ido disminuyendo poco a poco, y el hecho decisivo en su contra ha sido el distanciamiento y la ruptura crecientes entre Al Qaeda y la población suní, cuya alianza se fue enfriando a medida que los dirigentes suníes se convencían de que, al contrario de lo que creyeron al principio, las tropas norteamericanas e inglesas sólo abandonarán el país cuando el gobierno iraquí esté en condiciones de asegurar el orden y la paz. En otras palabras, de que Irak no será un segundo Vietnam.
Bartle Bull señala que la alianza entre Al Qaeda y otras sectas terroristas fundamentalistas —todas ellas más o menos identificadas con un wahabismo radical—, empeñadas en resucitar la pureza de costumbres y la ortodoxia doctrinaria “de tiempos del profeta” y los suníes del Baaz —un partido inspirado en el nacional socialismo de Hitler, no hay que olvidarlo— ansiosos de restaurar los privilegios de que gozaban en tiempos de Saddam Hussein estaba condenada al enfrentamiento. El malestar fue creciendo cuando los fanáticos wahabistas extranjeros, en su furia puritana, empezaron a imponer en las zonas dominadas por ellos su rígida moral, prohibiendo el cigarrillo, asesinando a los vendedores de alcohol y a los jeques de las tribus, así como casando a la fuerza a las jóvenes con los “emires” del llamado “Estado islámico de Irak”. La ruptura se consumó cuando los suníes comprendieron que podían encontrar una forma de acomodo y convivencia en el nuevo Irak donde la mayoría chií —tres veces más numerosa que la minoría suní— tendrá las riendas del poder.
Bull señala que la nueva política pragmática de los suníes ha hecho posible, por ejemplo, la notable transformación de la provincia de Anbar, durante buen tiempo una ciudadela de la resistencia y el terrorismo y ahora la más pacífica de todo el país. De las 18 provincias iraquíes, en la mitad de ellas la violencia se ha reducido a niveles mínimos o desaparecido. Este proceso debería acelerarse a medida que la población suní sienta, en los hechos, que su supervivencia no está amenazada en el Irak dominado por los chiíes y que su presencia tanto en las instituciones como en la vida económica, política y social se halla segura. Un paso en esta dirección, dice Bull, ha sido el acuerdo de principio entre chiíes, suníes y kurdos sobre la delicada cuestión de la distribución de los ingresos petroleros, que deberá confirmarse pronto con la firma de una ley, avalada por Estados Unidos, la Unión Europea y las Naciones Unidas.
Bull destaca algunos hitos claves en este desarrollo. La batalla entre suníes y chiís desencadenada con la destrucción, por aquéllos, de la mezquita de Samarra. Fue el momento en el que la guerra civil generalizada pareció inevitable. Pero los suníes, cediendo al realismo, dieron marcha atrás cuando se vieron derrotados. A partir de entonces comenzaron, con discreción al principio y ahora de manera explícita, a pactar con Estados Unidos y el gobierno de Maliki. Uno de los efectos de estos acuerdos ha sido el número creciente de suníes incorporados en los últimos meses al Ejército y a las fuerzas policiales iraquíes: cinco mil sólo en las últimas semanas. Al mismo tiempo, en un gesto de reciprocidad, el gobierno iraquí dio empleo en los servicios del Estado a otros siete mil suníes y reconoció el derecho a jubilación completa a todos los ex oficiales y soldados baazistas, con excepción de los 1500 vinculados a crímenes y torturas, la mayoría de los cuales, por lo demás, están ya presos, muertos o han huido a Siria, Jordania y Arabia Saudita.
Este es un resumen muy sucinto del ensayo de Bartle Bull. Mi impresión es que, aunque pueda parecer demasiado optimista y aunque no subraye lo suficiente, entre sus consideraciones, las secuelas trágicas que sin duda tendrá para la reconstrucción de Irak y la normalización de su vida social la atroz hemorragia de vidas humanas y bienes causada por el terror, así como la emigración al extranjero de sus mejores cuadros, ejecutivos y profesionales, las perspectivas que el analista británico señala para el porvenir de Irak son probablemente exactas, aunque los plazos sean acaso más prolongados de lo que él cree. Sólo el odio tan extendido hacia los Estados Unidos explica ese consenso, entre los comentaristas y políticos occidentales y tercermundistas, de que, al igual que en Vietnam, las tropas norteamericanas terminarán partiendo a la carrera, expulsadas de Irak por los “resistentes” y la repulsa de la opinión pública internacional. Con todo lo sangrienta y dolorosa que es la situación sobre el terreno, lo cierto es que en Irak no son Estados Unidos y Gran Bretaña sino las bandas terroristas las que van llevando ahora la peor parte. La contraofensiva última dirigida por el general Petraeus ha tenido incluso más logros de los esperados y, hasta el momento, no ha habido el menor retroceso. Y es claro que se hacían ilusiones quienes pensaban que con un triunfo demócrata en las próximas elecciones en Estados Unidos, vendría la desbandada. Hillary Clinton y Giuliani, los dos probables candidatos, han dejado bien en claro que a este respecto su posición es semejante: la retirada de las tropas se irá haciendo sólo en la medida en que el gobierno iraquí esté en condiciones de reemplazarlas tanto en la batalla contra el terror como en el mantenimiento del orden público. Si es así, yo también pienso que los enormes sacrificios hechos estos últimos cuatro años y medio por el pueblo iraquí no habrán sido inútiles.
comentarios
  1. Anonymous dice:

    Loca:

    Alucino con las sandeces que ha dicho este “experto” (Bartle Bull) que seguramente piensa que oriente medio es como disneylandia.

    Seguramente después que se publicaron estas sus opiniones se habrá quedado sin trabajo porque su ignorancia ha quedado demostrada sin temor a equivocación, hasta el Mallku debe tener una idea mas exacta que este expertillo de tres al cuarto y al que Vargas Llosa ha citado por se declaraciones polémicas y provocadoras, y claro en el mundo actual la provocación vende y eso Vargas Llosa lo sabe ya que el es artista en el mercadeo de las palabras.

    “…Irak no se ha desintegrado y su unidad territorial y política parece ahora más firme que antaño…” Esta afirmación es la mas cojuda de todas las cuales últimamente he escuchado referente a Irak, a proposito cito lo siguiente:

    “…. Este mismo verano, un alto representante del Estado kurdo-iraquí afirmaba que Iraq caminaba hacia su fragmentación y desaparición como Estado en posiblemente tres entidades políticas diferentes: al norte un Estado kurdo, al sur un Estado chíi, y en medio un tercer Estado de mayoría sunní. Estas declaraciones hacían alusión al ambiente sectario que se vive en el país árabe, lo que ha desarrollado unas dinámicas centrífugas que pueden terminar desmembrando el actual Iraq de postguerra….” http://emboscado.blog.com/2007/10/

    Creo que Loca que esta vez este post que con te has metido un autogol es por demás evidente más aun depues de que Turquia atacara a los Kurdos con el fin de que esto anularan la pretensión de soberania que tienen sobre estos territorios y a su vez puedan incentivar, mas aun, los deseos de independencia del kurdistan turco, por lo tanto de que todo esta en paz y que los Kurdos se mantienen contentos con su descentralización es una mentira que solo se creen los ingenuos.

    http://www.clarin.com/diario/1999/02/24/i-03001d.htm

    http://ipsnoticias.net/nota.asp?idnews=86434

    http://ipsnoticias.net/nota.asp?idnews=86385

    “….No ha estallado la guerra civil e Irán no ha ocupado Irak ni tutela su vida política. El país ha dejado de ser un peligro para la paz mundial y, aunque muy lentamente, va convirtiéndose en la primera sociedad árabe con elecciones libres, libertad de prensa, partidos políticos diversos y derechos civiles reconocidos…”

    Esto loca es una broma negra, creo que el experto estaba borracho y drogado o que el vargas llosa le pago para sacar unas afirmaciones lo mas cojudas posible para vender mas periodicos. ¿Qué no hay guerra civil en Irak? ¿Y porque razón sunnies y chiitas se masacran mutuamente? ¿Por qué aparecen cuerpos de distintas comunidades religiosas con un tiro en la nuca? Loca esto ya es una guerra religiosa y una guerra racial, o sea que los cojudos de los USA han cambiado la dictadura laica de saddam por la anarquia religiosa fundamentalista de infinidad de grupúsculos terroristas que han visto su camino despejado después de que los norteamericanos destruyeran el ejercito iraqui (despidieron a todos los militares y les dejaron sin sueldo después de la guerra) que era el unico obstáculo para fundamentalizar Irak. El mismo caso que Pakistan, si destruyes su ejercito el pais entero se volveria hiper fundamentalista, o igual que en Turquia, si destruyes su ejercito Turquia se islamizaria y se volveria un regimen religioso.
    http://www.clarin.com/diario/2006/03/01/elmundo/i-02001.htm

    http://www.clarin.com/diario/2006/02/25/opinion/o-03301.htm

    http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/spanish/international/newsid_4821000/4821868.stm
    (con declaraciones del ex primer ministro iraqui donde reconoce que Irak vive una guerra civil)

    En Irak mueren cada semana un promedio de 50 personas asesinada por ataques terroristas, y los que mueren son tanto sunies y chies por lo tanto la guerra interna es por demas virulenta, ¿Por qué crees que los militares de USA exigen a diario que su gobierno aumente el numero de efectivos? ¿Por qué todo está en paz o porque todo esta mejor cada día?.

    Es que hasta los mismos militares norteamericanos reconocen su fracaso, el ex jefe supremo en Irak, General Ricardo Sanchez ha declarado hace muy poco tiempo que USA fracasó en Irak:

    http://www.lagaceta.com.ar/vernota.asp?id_seccion=10&id_nota=240019

    EN FIN LOCA ESTA VEZ ME HAS DADO LA OPORTUNIDAD DE HACER BOLSA AL EXPERTO ESE Y LO QUE YO DIGO LO DICE TODO EL MUNDO, HAY QUE SER COJUDO, ADEMAS DE MUY SUBNORMAL, PARA DECIR QUE USA HA GANADO LA GUERRA EN IRAK Y QUE IRAK ES HOY UN ESTADO DE DERECHO.

    FAST

  2. ojoconelsordo dice:

    Eres un bolita en toda la extensión de la palabra. Opinas con un apasionamiento como si se tratara de un partido de fútbol entre el Wilster y el Bolívar.
    No tengo tiempo para decirte quién es Bull, pero te adelanto que no es ningún cojudo e hijo de la chingada como el Ministro milico Ramón QUintana y otros “expertos izquierdistas del mas y latinoamaricanos que odian a los yanquies más que los propios irakis.
    Lee el artículo a ver si entiendes

    Bartle Bull is an author and journalist. He has covered the middle east for the “New York Times” and other publications.
    The hundred-mile drive from Baghdad to Najaf usually takes about three hours. It is hot country with low dusty towns and villages built of mud brick. About halfway along the road there is a turn to the right marked by an arch in the form of a pair of swords meeting at the tips. They are double-tipped swords, curved like those of the Imam Ali, whose defeat in war in 657 was the founding event of the Shia faith. The turning leads to Karbala but the bridge on the way was blown up during last year’s invasion and has not been repaired.

    Iraqis call the middle part of this route the Bermuda triangle, on account of the kidnappings, ambushes and roadside bombs that happen there. This is Shia country, but along the road there are two adjacent towns called Mahmoudiya and Latifiya with Sunni minorities of maybe 25 or 30 per cent. Saddam Hussein used to give extra support to such pockets of Sunnis. He knew that his co-religionists in places like these had a special stake in supporting his rule: they felt surrounded, which they were, and embattled, which they would become if the Ba’athist order were ever upended. With jobs, construction and money, Saddam took extra pains to secure their loyalty. The Shias dominate the population here south of Baghdad, but today it is Sunni violence that sets the tone.

    On a broader national scale, Iraq’s 60 per cent Shia majority faces a challenge similar to that posed by this local Sunni insurgency at the gateway to the holiest Shia cities: Najaf and Karbala. With the approach of the elections scheduled for January, the Shias are looking forward to their first chance to run their affairs since the Ottomans conquered southern Mesopotamia in 1534. But Sunnis, after five centuries as the ruling minority, do not want to let it happen.

    In Najaf, an hour south of the Bermuda triangle, the Shias themselves have raised two insurrections this year, one from April to June and the other in August. The uprisings pitted the supporters of radical young cleric Muqtada al-Sadr against the US-led occupation but also highlighted major schisms within the Shia community. Iraqis have lots of theories about why these uprisings began. Some Shias blame trigger-happy Spanish troops upset by the Madrid bombings. Others blame the replacement of the US first infantry division by the more gung-ho 11th marine expeditionary unit. Some say Muqtada’s men are thugs who prefer a criminal environment, or martyrs protecting Shia Islam’s holiest places, or fundamentalists gunning for a theocracy, or simply the voice of a miserably poor community that has not seen the democracy or the improved life it was promised.

    The real reason is likely to be that Muqtada was fighting for tactical advantage within the Shia community, seizing momentum from the older, conservative clerical establishment – and all the while earning cross-sectarian credit as Iraq’s most vocal anti-occupation nationalist. Muqtada is certainly attuned to the January elections and the opportunity they represent. As the fighting faded in Najaf at the end of the most recent uprising, men at his headquarters next to the Imam Ali shrine showed me a photocopy of an agreement between him and Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, bearing the seals of the two men. Among Muqtada’s five commitments was a promise to “participate actively in the political process” and “work co-operatively” towards the elections. In a little-noticed development of profound importance for the prospects of Iraqi democracy, Muqtada is currently making good on that promise under the guidance of the secular Shia politician Ahmed Chalabi.

    An angry and fearful Sunni minority, an occupation whose presence seems, in the eyes of many Shias, to taint the progress it promulgates, and divisions within their own ranks: these are the main challenges for the Shias as Iraq looks ahead to January. The response of Iraq’s majority sect to these issues will determine the next phase of Iraq’s transition.

    It would be wrong to refer to Iraq’s 15m-odd Shias as a “community.” The very notion of Shia identity in Iraq, of a sense of self-awareness shared across tribal, economic, political and even religious strata, is problematic. Before the expansion of the Iraqi oil industry radically changed the country’s demography in the 1950s and 1960s, there were three principal Shia elites. The largest, and quietest, was made up of tribal chiefs looked up to by the nomads and farmers of the country’s southern half – from the marshes in the southeast, across the “land between the rivers” and into the vast desert bordering Arabia.

    A second elite was the religious establishment in the cluster of holy cities south of Baghdad – Najaf, Karbala and to a lesser extent Kufa. Largely hereditary, often competing with Iranian cities such as Qom for global leadership of the sect, and entwined with the local hierarchy of merchant families, Iraq’s Shia clerical aristocracy traditionally eschewed participation in government but nonetheless exerted much influence.

    The merchant class formed a third elite. The merchants of the holy cities had an interest in maintaining the international flow of pilgrims and corpses to Shia Islam’s most revered shrines and cemeteries. In bigger towns like Baghdad and Basra, a more secular middle class of tradesmen and, later, financiers and courtiers, strove for influence under the Sunni-dominated rule of the Ottomans, the British and the Iraqi monarchy.

    In the 1950s, it all began to change. The urban boom that accompanied the expansion of the Iraqi oil industry led vast hordes of the rural poor into the big cities. By 1961, Wilfred Thesiger was writing about the Shia marsh Arabs sucked into an “old-fashioned gold rush… the stampede to the towns… this mass immigration.” He loathed the drain of nomads into big cities, and especially mourned the fate of the young boys who heeded the siren call of progress. Those who did leave the marshes or the countryside, said Thesiger, “like hundreds of thousands of others in Iraq… probably ended by selling newspapers or Coca-Cola in Basra or Baghdad, as well as stealing from cars and pimping for taxi drivers.”

    Today, the Shias of Iraq are largely an urban people, and the majority of them lead dreary lives in very unpleasant slums. Their sons are doing just what Thesiger predicted. Or they are fighting the Americans. Only a quarter of Iraq’s Shias attend mosques regularly, but their dismal material existences and the physical insecurity in some parts of the country are leading to increasingly intense religious identification. And unlike their tribal forebears in the marshes and deserts only 50 years ago, these people are not quiet. Muqtada al-Sadr is their voice.

    On the road to Najaf, you leave the Bermuda triangle behind when you pass the final eucalyptus grove of Latifiya. Before you reach that point, there is always a blood-congealing traffic jam that snarls the main crossroads during daylight. In the mornings, the slow-crawl congestion provides a chance for a long look at the roadside police station, its roof blasted off and its walls scorched. On its half-standing concrete curtain wall, spray-painted Arabic script proclaims: “We will kill all the dogs who work with the Americans. We will kill the slaves of dollars. We will kick the dirty Americans out of our country.”

    In the late afternoons the traffic comes to a full stop, as there has almost always been a bomb or an ambush ahead. If you are a foreigner in the back of a car, it makes sense to lie down. After half an hour of silent promises that you will never travel that road again, you and your companions might squeeze through the bottleneck created by a new crater in the road. Or if the jam is really bad, you might turn off on to the dirt roads between the eucalyptus trees and the maize, and hope that the obscuring dust is protection enough as you crawl through the rebel Sunni countryside where the two French journalists, captured on the main road in August, are said to be held.

    Then at last there is the final eucalyptus grove, where the traffic pattern changes again: pedal-to-the-floor on a straight road, swerving past slower vehicles until the last trees slip past. Now you are in Shia country proper and you feel safer, for there is a big difference between Sunni and Shia violence in Iraq.

    The basic formula is simple. The Shias, with 55-60 per cent of the population, want elections as soon as possible. The Sunnis, with 15-20 per cent of the population, fear democracy. And the Kurds, with another 15-20 per cent, will play along politely while they wait in their mountains for someone to make the wrong move that either forces or allows them to complete their independence.

    History adds passion to these dry numbers. Iraq’s Shias have lived under mostly Sunni rule since their first imam, Ali, was deposed from the caliphate in 657, 25 years after the death of Muhammad. The Ottoman conquest in 1534 brought rule by local Sunnis in the service of the global caliphate based in Istanbul. When the British were given the mandate to rule in 1920, they relied on Sunnis. In 1932, when Iraq was granted independence, the British brought in a Sunni monarchy. Sunni officers overthrew the monarchy in 1958 and Saddam’s Ba’ath party took over in 1968. (Saddam, already effective leader, became president 11 years later.) He ruled for 30 years with his Sunni clique of national socialists and tribal cronies. After these five centuries of subordination, there is today a wrenching urgency in Shia politics. The long wait may finally be over.

    The Sunni position is equally inflamed by the past. After five centuries of rule, the Sunnis hate the sudden prospect of relegation to a parliamentary presence not much larger than that of Britain’s Liberal Democrats. Iraq’s Sunnis have already lost the material privileges – better jobs, places at universities, more services in their towns – that Saddam gave them for 30-odd years. Predictably, it is those who have lost most who are reacting most violently to the notion of ratifying these changes in January: senior party officials, clansmen from Saddam’s home town of Tikrit, members high and low of Saddam’s enormous apparatus of violence, residents of isolated Sunni pockets such as the Bermuda triangle towns.

    A relatively orderly autumn means elections in January. For the Ba’athists and Salafis – the revanchist outlaws and the Islamist fundamentalists – who perpetrate Iraq’s Sunni violence, such an outcome is unacceptable. Chaos is what they need.

    Thus Sunni violence is more a matter of terrorism than of insurgency. It is Sunnis who carry out the spectacular, media-driven acts of violence: the car bombs, the suicide attacks on queues of police recruits or children celebrating a new sewage facility, the abduction of aid workers, the assassination of foreign workers like Ken Bigley who are helping to rebuild the country. For the Ba’athists and Salafis, tiny and electorally hopeless minorities within a larger Sunni minority, driving out the occupation is not the priority. It gives them their raison d’être, and in Falluja it has even given them salaries and uniforms. Their real target is the reconstruction of Iraq.

    This should not be a surprise. For the Sunni extremists, and for the moderates who collude with their silent support, Iraq is a Shia country waiting to happen. Nobody – not the Baghdad government, the occupation, the UN, the Shias themselves – is explaining to them that “democracy” does not have to mean the “tyranny of the majority.” Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, the 74-year-old grand spiritual leader of the Shias, contributed to the Sunni fears this summer by insisting that the UN resolution laying out a framework for the occupation and the electoral and constitutional processes ignore Iraq’s federalist interim constitution. He has since made noises about minority rights under a Shia-dominated democracy, but Sunnis remain profoundly worried.

    The Shia violence in Iraq is very different from the Sunni version. It is truly an insurgency. Instead of targeting Iraqis, aid workers, lorry drivers and infrastructure, it targets occupation forces. The weapons of the Shia insurrection are Kalashnikovs and modified Katyusha launch tubes – rather than the car bomb and the camcorder. During the last Najaf siege, a British journalist and French documentary-maker were kidnapped by Shias in separate incidents in southern Iraq. Muqtada al-Sadr quickly secured their release. When Shias near Basra started attacking the oil pipelines, Muqtada’s office in Najaf made them stop. The Shia rebels want the occupation out but they share the occupation’s main objective: a stable, democratic Iraq.

    Muqtada’s forces are called the Mahdi army and the black they wear is the colour of the Imam Muhammad al-Mahdi. The last of the Shias’ 12 imams, the Mahdi disappeared in an act of divine concealment in Samarra in the 9th century. His return, when it comes, will bring an age of justice.

    Until then, Shiism must define itself by grievance. The faith began with the rejection, betrayal, and murder of Imam Ali by Muslim political rivals in the 7th century. Ali’s followers claimed that Ali, as Muhammad’s closest male relative, should have been ruler of the Islamic community. Thus for the next thousand years the world of Islam was ruled by a series of caliphs whose power the Shias considered illegitimate. According to the Shias, all but one of their 12 imams – Ali and his heirs – were murdered by the Sunni caliphs. The final imam was the only one to escape: the Mahdi, hidden by God, until whose return there can be no justice.

    In the time of Ali and for 19 years after his death, the Shiah-i-Ali (party of Ali) was largely a political movement expressing disaffection with the worldly power of the caliphate. That changed with the second of Shiism’s two great founding moments: the massacre of Ali’s son Hussein and a small group of followers at Karbala in 680. Most of the murders of the Shia imams at the hands of the Sunnis were nasty little assassinations. Poison was the main weapon. Hussein’s death at Karbala was different, bigger and somehow more shocking. It was the first time that the family of the Prophet had been martyred in an all-out slaughter involving large groups.

    The searing events at Karbala turned the Shiah-i-Ali, the political movement of the dispossessed into a fully-fledged sect. Today the Shias account for 10 per cent of Muslims worldwide. They commemorate Hussein’s martyrdom and the complicity of their forebears in annual pilgrimages and passion plays. In February they will be back on the streets of Karbala in their millions for the day of Ashura. Weeping and howling, flagellating themselves and others, they will be beating their chests and foreheads, cutting their own scalps, celebrating guilt and oppression with white clothes, swords and blood.

    Ali is said to be buried in a tomb at the famous shrine in Najaf. The city is also home to the four-man council of grand ayatollahs, which provides scholarly and spiritual leadership to Shias around the world. (Iranian Shiism, because of its close connection with the Iranian state, is currently somewhat separate from the global faith.) Najaf’s cemetery, the Valley of Peace, offering an eternity in close proximity to the Imam Ali, is where all Shias aspire to be buried. With 5m graves, Shiism’s holiest city is the largest concentration of death on earth.

    On any road to Najaf you will usually see vehicles with coffins strapped to their roofs, bringing bodies for burial in the precinct of Ali. The corpses have been coming in every day for a millennium in an endless pilgrimage of the dead. They come from India and Pakistan, from Lebanon, Iran, the Gulf, the Caucasus and north Africa. Heading south from Baghdad on any morning after a night of fighting in Sadr City, the capital’s vast Shia slum, you can find yourself looking across the streaming tarmac at a pick-up truck full of Mahdi fighters bringing a dead friend to his resting place. You will know them by their black beards and black T-shirts, and you will see their anger even if you can’t hear it as they mouth their chants and incantations through the wind and dust.

    In August, many like them went south to Najaf to die as well as to be buried. For three weeks the cemetery became a battlefield and the city became a cemetery. The graveyard is like a small city anyway: five square miles of alleys and narrow lanes between tombs and mausoleums that look like tiny houses. The crypts and catafalques were killing zones for the Mahdi army and the US marines and cavalry this summer. Neither side worried much about the eternal rest of those who had already died – the underground tombs in the Valley of Peace were littered with cigarette butts and streaked toilet paper. Above, empty brown US military food packets were blowing around in the dust among the hundreds of olive green ordinance shells. A packet of strawberry milkshake sat ripped open atop a grave, its white powder spilled out on the flat tombstone. Tank treads have laid lines of rubble along the narrow paths.

    For all the violence in this city of the dead, I saw only two graves that had been destroyed completely. While I was nearby, two middle-aged men arrived. They searched through the detritus of the two graves and then held up a pair of tablets, each bearing the name of a man from near Karbala. “This is my father’s grave,” said one of them. He was crying. “Why did he have to die twice?” he asked.

    At the height of the August violence in Najaf, crowds surged through the streets and the Iraqi police and national guard careened about in lorries and SUVs, AKs bristling out of windows or over rails probably made for sheep. Dozens had been killed in Najaf and nearby Kufa that morning and the day before (one never knows the real numbers in Iraq). There seemed to be gunfire everywhere and puddles of blood were still red on the pavements. Ambulance drivers were refusing to take Shia wounded to the hospital – for the good of the wounded. They said the Iraqi police were executing the wounded as partisans.

    With an Iraqi friend I ducked through a doorway and into the front room of a house. There were four men inside. On the walls there were posters of Muqtada al-Sadr and his father, Ayatollah Muhammad Sadiq al-Sadr, murdered by Saddam in 1999. The posters showed the al-Sadrs looking fierce or wise, superimposed upon backgrounds of vast crowds, with slogans and images of masked gunmen dressed in black. The main thing I noticed about my hosts, these Muqtada supporters, is that they were not all that young, and we were not in a slum. I wondered where their pictures of Sistani were. The people of Najaf were supposed to be relatively conservative.

    “Spiritually, Sistani is undisputed,” they told me. (Muqtada is at the very bottom of Shiism’s very hierarchical clerical ladder.) “But the political leadership is entirely Muqtada al-Sadr. Muqtada is the only true nationalist in Iraq – like his father before him.” Muqtada’s father had led the Shia resistance to Saddam in the 1980s and 1990s. In contrast to his Iranian-born, naturally cautious contemporary Ali al-Sistani, Muhammad Sadiq al-Sadr was a home-grown Arab who mobilised the poor through a wide network in mosques and communities, preaching to hundreds of thousands at his fiery Friday prayers.

    I have often heard this refrain among the Shia: Sistani, they say, is our spiritual leader, but our problems are political, and only Muqtada speaks to those.

    In the heart of the old city stands the holy shrine of Imam Ali. Across the street, fire trucks were hosing blood from the shrine’s broad forecourt. An old man told me that 150 people had been buried in front of us when the building above them collapsed. Some were still alive yesterday, banging on a metal door.

    In the devastation around us there was a peculiar beauty: shards of glass spun and suspended in windows like mobiles, bright orange awnings flapping dreamily in a light breeze, and a sparkling everywhere underfoot. When Shias pray, they often put a little tablet, made from Karbala clay, on the ground towards Mecca. When they bow forward, their heads touch the holy earth. Piles of these tablets, wrapped up in white paper with jaunty red strings, lay in broken heaps outside the shrine.

    On a later visit to Najaf, looking ahead to the elections planned for the end of January, I visited the offices of Muqtada himself in a couple of rundown houses in an alley next to the Imam Ali shrine. I wanted to know what sort of an Iraq his people envisioned. There were reports from his year-long rule in the centre of Najaf that the Mahdi army was a Taleban-in-waiting.

    Ahmed Sheybani is one of Muqtada’s top three advisers. He is thin, and dresses all in white. He is 34, which makes him five to ten years older than his boss (Muqtada claims to be 31 but is widely believed to be younger). Sheybani spoke nervously, with glazed eyes that never looked at me. “Ninety per cent of this country is Islamic,” he told me, “so naturally the new regime would be considered Islamic. But this would not be intolerant Islamic rule. It will respect the rights of minorities. It will not oblige Sunnis to abide by Shia law, or Christians to behave like Muslims. The most important thing is to protect the rights of minorities. Alcohol is permitted for Christians, for example. It should be permitted for Christians to go to church, or Jews to the synagogue.

    “Within the Shia community, drinking or playing music will be punished if it is public or provocative, just as for Christians to have more than one wife is forbidden. Islamic law will be applied to Islamic women. Women should be in all professions, but they would have to wear a scarf. Women are like gems. If you see a precious stone in a precious case, you will want it more than if you see it in a cheap case. Look at your Virgin Mary – she covered her head.

    “It will be normal to have different levels of law. In America, for example, they have federal law and state law. For the Kurds, their independence is forbidden internationally. Their army should be under the central government, but in other matters we are comfortable with federalism within a unified Iraq.”

    In the alley outside Muqtada’s offices it looked as if they were preparing for an earthquake, not government. Medical supplies lined the narrow space: glass ampoules of potassium chloride from France, bandages from the Korean International Co-operation Agency, intravenous glucose from Egypt, Great Northern beans from USAid. In late September, Sheybani was arrested by US marines in a 2am raid on the alley. He has not been released.

    Among religious Shias in Iraq, the older clerical establishment of Najaf represents the opposite end of the spectrum to Muqtada’s people. While religious authority is not hereditary in Shia Islam, it has tended to function that way over the centuries. Muqtada comes from a clerical lineage as distinguished and ancient as any in global Shiism – but his father was a rabble-rousing man of the people and so is he. Muqtada’s people are blamed by everyone except themselves for the murder of Sistani’s advocate, the moderate cleric Abdul Majid al-Khoei, when he returned in April 2003. No love was lost in the old days between the Khoei-Sistani camp and Muqtada’s father.

    Radwan Killidar is the 41-year-old hereditary keeper of the keys of the Najaf shrine, the 11th in his family to hold the position. Saddam summoned him from exile to take over after his father’s death, but Radwan demurred. His brother took the job instead, but was executed after the Shia intifada of 1991. A cousin then stepped up but was killed, along with al-Khoei, by Muqtada’s men outside the shrine in 2003.

    According to Radwan, the Mahdi army took the shrine by force a year later. “At the beginning of 2004, Muqtada’s people came in from Sadr City, Kufa, everywhere, and took over Najaf. They took the keys to the shrine from my deputy. They told him: ‘You’ve got children, why make them orphans?’ My people are part of the religious establishment, so they don’t carry weapons. I had given them directions not to spill one drop of blood. Within a couple of months the Mahdi army had made the shrine their base. They sacked my people, beat them. Before they took over, Najaf was a thriving city. Muslims came from all over the world – from the Gulf, India, Iran, Pakistan. Now the lives of Najafis have been ruined.

    “If the Mahdi army was a nationalist movement they would not have signed up with Iran. I have seen their food and medicine. It is all Iranian. Meanwhile I have been in Najaf for one year and I never saw the Spanish or the Americans anywhere near the shrine. In fact, I haven’t seen them much at all.

    “I think we are talking about a Taleban-in-waiting. I have heard of people in Najaf being called to the Shari’a courts and when they refused to go they were shot outside their doors.”

    Twenty years before the fall of Saddam thrust Sistani and his camp into politics, Iraq had two main Shia parties: the Da’wa and the Supreme Council for the Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI). Both have joined the various Iraqi political structures arranged by the occupation, and in so doing have lost support with the most militant Shia “street.”

    The Da’wa, or “Call,” fought for 30 years against the Ba’ath party following Iraq’s pseudo-communist revolution in 1958. Muhammad Bakir al-Sadr was its chief founder. In 1980, in the aftermath of activities inspired by Iran’s successful Shia revolution the previous year, he became the first grand ayatollah in modern history to be executed. Over the next 23 years, as Saddam’s regime identified Shia activism with the Da’wa, about 60,000 Shias were executed under a decree making Da’wa membership punishable by death. The Da’wa is split today, but in May Ibrahim Jaffari, the leader of its main faction, was rated the third most important public figure in Iraq (after Sistani and Muqtada) in a Financial Times poll. As one of Iraq’s two vice-presidents, Jaffari has more personal support than anyone else in the Iraqi government. He could well command 10 per cent of the Iraqi electorate. His party has huge prestige from its suffering and its long record of struggle, but is essentially moderate with regard to Islam. It has not seized the post-invasion opportunities as aggressively as Muqtada, and its more measured approach might well endear it to the elusive “silent majority.” That said, the youthful and urban demographics of Iraq’s Shias render the very existence of a “silent majority” debatable.

    SCIRI is a coalition of sorts that was founded as an Iranian initiative in 1982. During Saddam’s time the Iranian connection gave SCIRI the advantage of a safe haven, plus training facilities for its military wing, the Badr Brigades, a militia that at the time of the March 2003 invasion numbered around 10,000 men in uniform. The Iranian connection has since made it difficult for SCIRI to claim legitimacy in the eyes of Iraqis, but the group does enjoy residual respect. When its leader Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim was killed by a giant car bomb outside the holy shrine in Najaf in August 2003, 100,000 Shias mourned him in the city’s streets. Since his death, or maybe long before, the wind seems to have left SCIRI’s sails. The head of its newspaper in Baghdad once unwittingly explained his party’s flaccid condition to me thus: “SCIRI appeals to educated individuals who believe in a united Iraq without sectarianism or partisanship. We are not a party but a movement capable of containing multiple directions within a humanitarian framework.” He thought that SCIRI would run jointly “with Da’wa and other Shia parties” at the January elections. SCIRI will be a player in January, but not a prime mover.

    Najaf is the spiritual capital of Iraqi Shias, and a constant cockpit for the ebbs and flows of their fortunes. But Sadr City is where the demographic heft lies. As Iraq’s pre-eminent slum, it is also the place that embodies the energy of Iraqi Shia politics. With 3m people, it comprises half of all of Baghdad, almost 25 per cent of Iraq’s Shia population, and over 10 per cent of the entire country.

    In daylight, Sadr City can be a relatively straightforward slum. The sidewalks seem an endless alternation of puddles and rubbish. The animals of the barnyard are everywhere, beast and fowl resting in shade, drinking from rusting oil drums, picking through the drifts of rubbish, fleeing children. It is as if some ancient bucolic life had been laid down accidentally on top of the sewage and the broken streets: people and animals in a concrete arcadia where the loamy soil is trash a foot thick and the babbling brook is a gutter. Only the horses look alright – sad animals, but handsome-boned and not skinny.

    The physiology of war is ubiquitous: walls pocked with bullet holes like bad acne, beards of blackened concrete around the windows of gutted houses, lampposts knocked over by Bradleys and crooked like withered limbs. Even now, long after the end of the August uprising, there is fighting in Sadr City every night as the Americans probe the edges of the slum or “thunder run” in their tanks down the boulevards.

    On rooftops and in the streets there are many Shia flags, mostly green and black. These flags always – in Najaf, too, and elsewhere – seem to have frayed or cut edges and to be on long thin poles that slant over at an angle that looks both romantic and sinister. The green ones are for Ali and his martyrdom. The black ones are for al-Mahdi and the hope of his return. Black is the colour of Shia optimism.

    Like any slum, Sadr City is full of children. The youngest play war games and the oldest direct traffic for the Mahdi army. On the way to a friend’s house one day, I was told by a couple of kids, “No no, don’t step there, there’s a mine.” There was no mine, but the kids weren’t exactly joking. They were playing a new game called “Mahdi army and Americans.” A hundred yards away a ten-year-old girl was teaching her little sister how to shoot a toy RPG – three feet of PVC pipe with a cone on the front and the bottom of a Sprite bottle providing the juice at the back. Thesiger would have approved, if they hadn’t been girls. It was better than selling Coca-Cola.

    Muqtada al-Sadr’s baby face and beard are on posters everywhere. The only other face you will see on a wall in Sadr City is his father. The many residents I have spoken to have all told me that in an election they will simply follow Muqtada’s wishes. If there is no election, they won’t mind unless Muqtada minds. If he minds, they will mind a lot.

    Despite the nightly fighting in the city that bears his father’s name, Muqtada is reaching an accommodation with Iraq’s political process. While he and the occupation loathe each other, they have common cause on the matter of most importance to them. Unlike the Sunnis, with their fears about a democracy that has not proved that it can guarantee them anything, Muqtada and the Americans both want a quiet vote in January.

    In September, a member of Muqtada’s four-man inner circle for political planning told me that the movement was planning to form a political party and run in the January elections. They were still working out the details, but if true, this would be a mammoth boost for the democratic project. They even had a working name: the Al-Mahdi party. Early in October, Muqtada’s people went public with these intentions, telling the New York Times, “We are ready to enter the democratic process.”

    The most telling thing about the decision to reveal these plans is the evolution in the name of the proposed party. The Al-Mahdi party, with its connotations of wild eyes and Kalashnikovs, is now out. The Patriotic Alliance is in. It is a masterful name – inclusive, positive and entirely unobjectionable. It is not the sort of name that would emerge naturally from Muqtada’s dirty back alley in Najaf. It bears the imprint of Iraq’s most intelligent politician and the emerging leader of the entire Shia political current: Ahmed Chalabi.

    Chalabi’s comeback is no surprise. The flux and chaos of Iraqi politics sail straight into his sweet spot. The yogi-like Sistani in the Najaf alley he never leaves, dozy old SCIRI, earnest Da’wa, the pimply Mahdi army, a dozen frenetic little sub-groups, all floundering with a new system called constitutional democracy that has not been quite settled yet and that none of them has ever really had to understand – it is all Karbala clay in the hands of a master sculptor.

    Iraqis know that Chalabi is the one man alive without whom Saddam would still be their ruler. And from the moment of Saddam’s fall, just as leading up to it, Chalabi has done everything right. He has publicly (if not necessarily privately) fallen out with Washington over a featherweight intelligence stink involving Iran. The world has watched the Allawi government vandalise his house and issue a ludicrous arrest warrant accusing him of counterfeiting Iraq’s worthless old currency. Shortly before I last spoke to Chalabi, he had survived an ambush that killed two of his guards at Mahmudiya in the Bermuda triangle.

    Saddam, Washington, Allawi, the Sunnis: Chalabi has the right enemies. When I pointed this out to him at his house in Baghdad last month he laughed and said: “That’s not a bad thing.” Equally importantly, he has the right friends. A member, like Allawi, of a leading family from Baghdad’s secular Shia merchant class (Chalabi means “head merchant”) he has been assiduously strengthening his position among his fellow Shias. The Mahmoudiya ambush took place after a meeting in Najaf between Chalabi and Sistani. Chalabi claims to have met with Sistani “ten or 12 times” – far more than any other political figure could claim – and he is one of the few Iraqi politicians to have been granted a meeting with Muqtada.

    Meanwhile, Chalabi played an active role in the parleying that brought an end to the Shia revolts in Najaf this spring and summer, and has created two Shia groups – the Shia house and the Shia political council – that bring Iraq’s Shia political movements and parties together under a loose “umbrella” reminiscent of Chalabi’s Iraqi National Congress (INC) during the last years of Saddam.

    Chalabi’s unified Shia front, running as a single list, is likely to capture close to the full Shia 60 per cent at January’s elections (which will happen on time, as the coalition rightly fears a Shia uprising far more than it fears the remaining Sunni suicide bombers). The likely breakdown of this 60 per cent is as follows: 25 per cent for Muqtada’s party, 15 per cent for the Da’wa, 10 per cent for SCIRI and 10 per cent for other parties such as the INC, Allawi’s Iraqi National Accord, the two Iraqi Hizbollah parties, and others. The two Kurdish parties, the KDP and PUK, which will gain around 20 per cent of the total vote, may also join the list. The main Sunni grouping is likely to be the Association of Islamic Scholars, which has so far ruled out participating in the elections but is likely to change its mind. A few secular parties, including the Iraqi Communist party, are likely to put themselves forward. Former senior Ba’athists and members of Saddam’s agencies of repression are barred from standing.

    When I saw Chalabi last, he had just arranged for Ali Smeasim, Muqtada’s top lieutenant, to visit the Kurds in their capital at Sulaimani. Muqtada’s people have since reached out to various Sunni Arab groups, and he has met with Chalabi’s Shia political council ten times or more. This unlikely sensei and young samurai, the desert fox and the backstreet preacher, seem to be getting along very well.

    This is more bad news for the Sunnis. So deep is the identity basis for politics in Iraq, and so persuasive are Chalabi’s coalition-building skills, that Muqtada is far more likely to team up with fellow Shias, even if they are relatively moderate, than with fellow revolutionaries across the sectarian divide.

    Talking to Chalabi is a pleasure. He has a sense of humour, which is rare enough in Iraq (although people on the street do sometimes ask my Iraqi friends how much they are planning to sell me for), and a frankness below the politician’s surface that can make a meeting feel like an enjoyable conversation rather than a lecture or a battle. When he says, for example, “My position is to involve the people who resisted Saddam,” he is doing much more than legitimising former exiles such as himself. He is referring to Muqtada, scion of a martyred father, and the old Shia parties that were slaughtered in the 1991 uprisings, and the Kurds who gave the INC an army through the 1990s. Unfortunately, “the people who resisted Saddam” also means “everyone but the Sunnis.”

    The formula can still work, however. We have seen the vision, spelled out to me by Muqtada’s people in Najaf, of different communities enjoying a degree of freedom and separation: “The most important thing is to protect the rights of minorities… We are comfortable with federalism within a unified Iraq….” The message is credible so far. While Muqtada’s number three – Sheybani – was explaining it to me in Najaf, his number two was in the north explaining it to the Kurds. And Sistani seems to be a guarantee standing behind the rhetoric of the more active players.

    Under Chalabi’s tutelage, this pragmatism is bound to grow. As he says, “It’s a fiction to think that the Iraqi government will ever be strong enough to force a certain system on any big group of people. We can’t start killing people just because they want to run their own affairs.” Iraq’s interim constitution allows any three or more of the country’s 18 provinces to form a federal unit. Chalabi says there is no reason why Iraq should not divide into six of these, or three.

    In the meantime Iraqis have a lot of voting ahead of them. The 275-member national assembly to be elected in January will draft a constitution by August, which will be put to a referendum two months later. By December 2005, elections under the new constitution are due. The January election will be held by proportional representation under a national party list system, which sidesteps the problem of lack of local political organisation. There will be about 30,000 voting booths scattered across the 275 electoral districts, with everyone voting for the same party lists. A quarter of seats are reserved for women.

    If Iraq’s Shias cannot persuade the Sunnis that they are sincere about minority rights in these elections, the Sunni attempt to derail the January election will grow more intense. “Sistani has been very firm about his desire to see these elections take place,” says Chalabi. The schedule of early sovereignty and January elections is, indeed, Sistani’s. “If elections are postponed it will only exacerbate the security situation.”

    Seyid Hazem al Araji, Muqtada’s top man in Baghdad, reinforces that view. Before his recent incarceration by the Americans, he told me that if there were any delay to the elections, “There will be doomsday.”

    Iraq’s Shias have been waiting 500 years, indeed since the murder of Ali, and now their

  3. Anonymous dice:

    buen intento loca pero no me convences, tambien eres el tipico bolita, obstinado hasta la extenuacion, eres pura raza de bronce loca, terco como la mula, tu y el mallku harian un buen concubinato y tendrian hijos que serian objeto de estudios antropologicos.

    FAST

  4. ojoconelsordo dice:

    El aceite de las aceitunas que te comes mientras estás recolectando en Sevilla te jodió el poco cerebro que te quedaba. Tú mismo lo dices que hay 50 muertos en Itak diarios; en la guerra Civil española había miles de muertos diarios hasta que llegaron al millón. NO EXISTE GUERRA CIVIL EN IRAK. Una guerra civil implica movimientos de tropas y material, miles de miles de muertos, tomas de ciudades y ejércitos organizados, nada de ello hay en IRak. Sólo cientos de grupos de maleantes que se ponen mutuamente bombas y de paso a los gringos sin ningún objetivo definido. Muérete de envidia pero Irak hoy por hoy es mucho más democrático que Bolivia. En la zona dominada por los británicos Basora y alrededores la violencia casi a cesado y muy raramente muere un soldado inglés al norte donde dominan los kurdos nadie los jode a los yanquies. Los que sí joden pero a los turcos son una facción de kurdos… Te cuento que los turquitos no se animan a atacarlos porque un error, una bombita que caiga cerca de los yanquies y los gringos hacen desaparecer a los turcos invasores.
    Nadie dice que la paz vaya a llegar pronto pero los gringos NO van a salir escapando de Irak como lo hicieron en Vietnam, pues hay muchísimos interese petroleros en juego. POr último recolector fast de aceitunas eres testigo que en mi anterior post sobre Irak dije que uno de los graves errores de los gringos fue dejar sin trabajo a los miles de miles de soldados y del partido Bas, ahora el gobierno de Maliki les está restituyendo sus bonosoles jajajajajajajajajajajajaj
    Me gustaría que un tara como tú la preñe a una gitana el resultado quisiera ver jajajajajajajajajajaj

  5. Anonymous dice:

    “Muérete de envidia pero Irak hoy por hoy es mucho más democrático que Bolivia. En la zona dominada por los británicos Basora y alrededores la violencia casi a cesado….”

    ESTA JOYITA LOCA ES DIGNA DE LAS CELEBRES MAS COJUDAS DE TODOS LOS TIEMPOS, si Irak esta tan bonito y es más democrático que Bolivia ¿porque no te vas a vivir alli?¿porque no vas a filmar tu puta serie a bagdad?, que bueno que todo este yendo de mil maravillas porque SOLO mueren 50 personas al dia, o sea que hasta que no mueran millones diariamente para ti no hay guerra civil, sigues con la cagalera porque si haces numeros desde la invasión, despues que el ejercito iraqui fuera destruido han muerto por ataques terroristas alrededor de 25.000 personas

    http://www.jornada.unam.mx/2006/07/10/030n1mun.php

    http://www.20minutos.es/noticia/191981/0/muertos/onu/irak/

    http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/spanish/international/newsid_4697000/4697065.stm

    Oye directorcillo de pacotilla ¿desde cuando una guerra civil para ser considerada como tal es necesario millones de muertos?, en que teoria cojuda te basas para afirmar ello?, o sea que porque en la guerra civil murieron millones todas las demas guerras civiles para ser consideradas como tales deben palmarla por lo menos un milloncito. Es tan cojuda la afirmacion que es como decir que como en la guerra del chaco murieron menos de 100.000 personas no puede ser considerada una guerra.

    http://www.abc.com.py/paraguay/g_chaco.htm

    Oye loca ademas esos “ja jaja” te hacen parecer mas tonto de lo que aparentas, pareces un niño y cuando estornudas porque no pones puajaaa `puajjjj o cuando te tiras un pedete pon pppppiii, ya tienes una edad y esas cosas son de niños que se ponen a chatear

    FAST

  6. ojoconelsordo dice:

    jajajajajaj DIsculpa fast pero yo no tengola culpa que no muera más gente en Irak y tampoco soy culpable de que no haya guerra civil.Pero para que estés feliz voy a desear que las matanzas en Irak se multipiquen, que mueran miles de miles de yanquies.
    Además te voy a dar un consejo: Seguro que en tu trabajo o en la chabola donde vives debes conocer muchos marroquiés… Sería bueno que tomes contacto con ellos (si es que no lo has hecho) y puedas enlistarte en algún grupo de malentes musulmanes como Al qAEDA, aL Ansar o Al Huevo viajar a Irak (me imagino que cuidar perros en España es harto aburrido) y por tu propia mano aumentar los muertos diarios en Irak, además puedes ayudar para que la guerra civil que tanto deseas pueda hacerse realidad y lo que es mejor (si tienes un poco de suerte) hasta puedes asesinar a un soldado o a varios yanquies. Puedes ser una especie de Ché Guevara bolita en Irak y si te matan los iraquies te pueden convertir no en santo si no en martir del Yihad islámico. No vas a ganar mucha plata y hay un 99% de posibilidades que te maten los gringos o los otros musulmanes, enemigos no te van a faltar.
    Voy a explicarte un poco sobre lo que es una verdadera guerra civil, no te servirá mucho esta información en tu trabajo diario pero te prometo postear un mensaje sobre perros de raza, te decía: como el nombre lo indica estamos hablando de una GUERRA entre connacionales para ello se necesita un condimento muy importante que es el TERRITORIO (me baso en la teoría de la guerra de Von Clausewitz) No existe guerra si no se toma territorio, cuando 2 ejércitos se tirotean desde sus fronteras sin traspazarlas no hablamos de una guerra sino de una refriega. Sabes en Irak la existencia de 2 o 3 o 4 ejércitos regulares??? Sabes de algún combate donde los sunís hayan tomado bases o territorio Chíta???? Sabes de movimientos o de movilizaciones de tropas iraquís dispuestas a enfrentarse— Por supuesto que no, la mayoría de los 50muertos son por culpa de asesinatos y no de combates directos entre milicias. Bueno pelotudo ya no pierdo más mi tiempo enseñandote cosas… Bueno no estás en la obligación de saber cosas que al fin y al cabo nunca te van a servir.

  7. […] Irak no fue otro Vietnam (este fue el título de un artículo que publiqué hace dos años y que se cumplió a raja tabla) […]

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